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Introduction
Lotteries are popular mechanisms for the provision of public goods and for charitable fundraising. Sales of lottery tickets generate revenue for the funding of a number of good causes including health, education, infrastructure development, environmental protection, sports, arts, and a variety of other programs. A recent study by Bloomberg using 2010 U.S. Census data reports that adults in the U.S. spend on average about $230 on lottery tickets per year.
1 This suggests that even small changes in the way lottery games are operated might result in substantial changes in funding for charitable causes.
The recent theoretical literature demonstrates that fundraising mechanisms in which a prize is awarded to one of the contributors -such as lotteries -are better at raising funds for public goods than voluntary contribution schemes. In an environment in which a finite number of identical consumers decide how much to contribute to a public good and how much to retain for private consumption, Morgan (2000) shows that a fixed prize raffle generates a higher level of public good contributions (net of the value of the prize) compared to voluntary donations. Goeree et al (2005) study the optimal design of fundraising mechanisms in the symmetric independent private value model. They demonstrate that in a setting in which the proceeds are used for the funding of a public good, the optimal mechanism is an all-pay auction; in this setting all-pay auctions outperform winner-pay auctions. More recently, Bos (2011) studies a complete information model and shows that lotteries generate more revenue than all-pay auctions when participants are sufficiently heterogeneous in the way they value the prize and the contributions to the public good.
In this paper we derive the optimal fundraising mechanism in a setting in which the designer chooses a nonlinear pricing scheme so as to maximize the revenue from lottery ticket sales. We build on the recent theoretical advancements presented in Goeree et al (2005) and Bos (2011) along several dimensions. Similarly to Goeree et al (2005) , in our model the designer chooses from a continuum of mechanisms, yet we allow for asymmetries between participants. We analyse a setting in which bettors can have different valuations for the prize and different marginal per capita returns associated with the provision of the public good. In that respect our analysis is conducted in the complete information framework presented in Bos (2011), yet we do not constrain the mechanism designer to the choice between the allpay auction and the lottery only. Instead, by varying the pricing scheme of lottery tickets, we consider a set of mechanisms in which the lottery and the all-pay auction arise as special cases.
The choice of a pricing scheme determines the relationship between the individual contribution of a participant and the chance of winning the prize as is standard in the mechanism design literature. The main focus of the paper is on determining whether, and in which circumstances, discounts for the purchase of multiple lottery tickets increase lottery proceeds. We operationalize the idea of discounts by considering power functions as a form of nonlinear pricing. That is, the designer specifies the power function parameter thus choosing among a continuum of pricing schemes.
This representation is useful because, as we show, the so described lottery games are isomorphic to Tullock (1980) contests. This feature facilitates the analysis by allowing us to use the equilibrium existence and characterization results from the Tullock contest literature (see e.g. Nti, 1999) . The main point of departure from the contest literature, however, is in viewing the contest parameter as an object of choice by the mechanism designer.
Our main contribution is a closed form expression which links the valuations of participants to the parameter describing the revenue maximizing ticket pricing function. Solving this mechanism design problem, we provide conditions under which the lottery is optimal among a continuum of fundraising mechanisms. In particular we show that, when bettors are sufficiently asymmetric in the way they value the prize and the public good, lottery ticket sales without discounts are optimal. Discounts, however, increase revenue in the presence of smaller asymmetries. 
The model
We consider a scenario in which two participants = 1,2 choose the number of tickets 1 and 2 that they purchase in a lottery. The value of the prize for participant is denoted by . The revenue from the lottery is used to provide a public good. We denote the per capita return of participant from the public good by , where 0 < < 1. In this model the lottery designer chooses a function ( ) which determines the total amount that bettor has to pay for a number of tickets. The expected payoff of bettor is thus given by
where ( , − ) = + − is the probability that participant wins the prize. The lottery designer seeks to determine the function ( ) in such a way that the lottery revenue ( 1 * ) + ( 2 * ) is maximized given the number of tickets 1 * and 2 * purchased in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the lottery. We will consider ticket pricing functions of the type ( ) = . A value of = 1 is the default scenario in which each lottery ticket has the same price, and values 0 < < 1 describe cases in which discounts are offered for the purchase of multiple tickets. 3 We first demonstrate that the presented setting is equivalent to a Tullock contest. Let us denote by = ( ) the total expenditures on lottery tickets by bettor and by = 1− the "adjusted valuation" of bettor . This valuation adjustment takes into account that participants benefit from their own contribution to the public good and transforms the original game into an equivalent game in which participants do not benefit from the public good, but compete for a larger prize which equals the original prize scaled by the factor 1 1− . 2 In the limit when all asymmetries disappear, it is known that the optimal mechanism is an all-pay auction (Goeree et al, 2005; Engers and McManus, 2007; Bos, 2011; Damianov and Peeters, 2012) . 3 Values > 1, while theoretically possible, might not be implementable as they imply additional charges for the purchase of multiple tickets. The proof is provided in the Appendix. The equilibria of the Tullock rent-seeking game have been studied by several authors (see, e.g. Perez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992; Nti, 1999; and Fang, 2002) . Nti (1999) derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 4 In the following analysis we will consider the cases for which this condition is satisfied. For the first order conditions we obtain
Lemma 1. The fundraising lottery is isomorphic to a Tullock contest in which players choose their expenditures on lottery tickets
Solving this system of equations we derive the equilibrium contribution levels
( 1 + 2 ) 2 ; 2 * = 1 2 +1
( 1 + 2 ) 2
The lottery designer chooses so that the lottery revenue
is maximized. The first order condition is given by the equation
The optimal value of thus satisfies the equation
The following lemma shows that the lottery revenue function is concave in so that the solution to equation (2) indeed represents the global maximum.
Lemma 2. The lottery revenue ( 1 , 2 , ) is concave in the parameter .
The proof is provided in the Appendix. We can assume now without loss of generality that 1 ≥ 2 . Following Nti (1999) and Bos (2011) we define the level of asymmetry between the players by the ratio of their adjusted valuations : = 1 2 ⁄ . The next statement summarizes our main result. 
The proof is provided in the Appendix. From Proposition 1 we can see that the optimal value of is linear in the level of asymmetry and is given by the equation
That is, for high levels of asymmetry, i.e. when > * , it is actually optimal to impose additional charges for the purchase of multiple tickets. In other words, the optimal mechanism for high asymmetry involves increasing rather than constant marginal price. As such a pricing scheme might not be easily implementable 5 our result implies that discounts are not optimal for high levels of asymmetry. When = * the standard case of linear pricing is optimal, and when < * , which occurs when bettors are more homogeneous, it is optimal to offer discounts on multiple tickets.
Conclusion
This note contributes to the mechanism design literature on charitable fundraising. We show that the standard lottery -in which each ticket is sold for the same price -is an optimal fundraising mechanism in the presence of strong asymmetries in the way participants value the prize and the public good. When participants are less asymmetric, it is optimal to offer discounts for the purchase of multiple tickets. This result might have implications for the potential of charitable organization to raise funds through lotteries in communities with varying degrees of income inequality.
ln ( ) ln ( ) = + 1 ( − 1)
• 1 ln ( ) Multiplying both sides by ln ( ) we obtain the value of reported in Proposition 1. Equation (5) yields the desired result. □
